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I. INTRODUCTION
Willingness to pay (WTP) estimates obtained from hypothetical survey methods such as the
contingent valuation method (CVM) have the potential to provide useful information to
policymakers. However, due to the lack of incentive compatibility in hypothetical choices and
respondents who are typically inexperienced with public good valuation, researchers have
questioned whether reported values truly reflect the amounts individuals would actually pay
for proposed policies (e.g., Diamond and Hausman 1994). Hence, intensive efforts are
underway to validate stated choices with actual choices, or with WTP estimates obtained from
revealed preference studies (Carson et al. 1996). A further aim of these studies is to develop
“calibration” techniques for appropriate adjustments of stated values (Arrow et al. 1993,
Cummings et al. 1997).
One obvious way of comparing actual with hypothetical WTP is to use experimental
techniques. Experiments have been conducted with private goods (Bishop and Heberlein
1979; Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstrom 1995; Loomis et al. 1996; Frykblom 1997) and
public goods provided by either individual donation (Seip and Strand 1992; Foster, Bateman,
and Harley 1997; Carlsson and Martinsson 2001) or group donation mechanisms (Cummings
et al. 1997; Ethier et al. 2000). Some of these experiments have provided evidence of a
substantial disparity between actual and hypothetical WTP. However, it is doubtful if these
results can be transferred to the contexts in which policymakers are typically interested (Fox
et al. 1998; Cummings and Taylor 1999; Carlsson and Martinsson 2001). Such transfer would
rely on the unlikely condition that any “hypothetical bias” is not commodity specific.
Regarding results from private good proxies this appears questionable because it is, among
other things, the lack of market experience in non-market decisions which make hypothetical3
payments suspect. Concerning donations, both actual and stated WTP are potentially affected
by free riding.
In contrast, the scope of non-experimental validation approaches, such as “convergent
validity” tests using travel cost or hedonic pricing information, extends to choices about
collectively provided public goods. However, these tests are unfortunately unable to capture
passive-use values of such goods, which are important in many public decision issues. Due to
these limitations of present validation and calibration methods, alternative approaches remain
in demand.
CVM surveys on public goods that are to be provided through taxation are often
designed to simulate actual referenda (Arrow et al. 1993; Hanemann 1994). This involves the
use of question formats, payment instruments, and hypothetical institutional contexts similar
to those of real-world referendum decisions. It had already been noted in the public choice
literature that in measuring preferences for public goods, voting choices may be the closest
available substitute for (unavailable) consumer choices (Bowen 1943). Based on this
observation public choice theorists have successfully applied economic theory to individual
non-market decision making such as voting in referenda (e.g., Deacon and Shapiro 1975).
More recently, a widely cited expert panel report on CVM discussed and recommended the
use of voting decisions as a context for validation and calibration of hypothetical choices
about goods with passive-use value (Arrow et al. 1993, p. 4607). Given appropriate data sets,
a comparison of CVM survey responses with respondents’ actual voting behavior for public
good issues might provide insights into the reliability of CVM estimates, and possibly yield
empirically based rules for calibration of obtained hypothetical responses.
In this paper we apply such an approach, theoretically developed in Schläpfer and
Hanley (2002), for comparing stated and actual WTP using voting information. Section 2
describes the calibration approach which, by its rationale, is closely related to median voter4
theory. In section 3 the method is applied to a set of CVM survey and actual referendum data.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a short discussion of the benefits and
limitations of the proposed method for validation and calibration of contingent values.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALIBRATION APPROACH
In the institutional context of a “referendum democracy” it is common practice that important
decisions about public goods are subject to referenda. Voting choices about changes in public
expenditures can be cast in a utility maximization framework (e.g., Deacon and Shapiro
1975). An individual i, given a known tax structure (with corresponding individual tax price
1
ti) and disposable income Ii casts a vote depending on whether she is better off with or
without the proposed change, considering both the change in the public good DG and the
change of her tax tiDG.
2 Thus, the individual’s decision will depend on whether the difference
between the status quo utility, U(Ii , G), and the utility under the changed policy, U(Ii – tiDG,
G + DG), is positive or negative. This basic framework is the same as in referendum format
contingent valuation surveys. Assuming that the individual approximately knows her
expected tax change due to the referendum
3 and strikes a balance between benefits and costs,
voting behavior can thus provide “hard” evidence about individuals’ actual WTP for public
goods. This information may be compared with stated WTP obtained in a closely related
context. The procedure would involve conducting a CVM survey jointly with a popular voting
                                               
1 An individual’s tax price is the individual’s additional tax payment when public expenditures increase by one
dollar (e.g., Stiglitz 2000).
2 It should be noticed that such information can only be derived when the treasury and hence taxpayers “pay the
bill”. If, for instance, a proposed change differentially affects specific industries (as in pollution control policies)
then the cost to the individual voter is difficult to assess and may strongly depend, e.g., on occupation (see e.g.
Fischel 1979, Kahn and Matsusaka 1997).
3 The circumstances under which this assumption is  justified are formally developed by Bergstrom and
Goodman (1973, pp. 284, 294).5
decision, where the survey would need to be appropriately designed to replicate the choice
issue of the actual referendum while retaining all other features, including the information
context, of a CVM survey.
Some practical difficulties involved in surveying CVM respondents’ actual voting
behavior aside, consistency testing of hypothetical voting choices can proceed by within-
sample comparison of hypothetical and actual binary choices (Schläpfer, Roschewitz, and
Hanley 2002). In contrast, calibration of hypothetical with actual WTP requires point
estimates of actual WTP. Regarding the derivation of such estimates there is an important
difference between the elicitation of values through referendum format CVM as currently
practiced and actual referendum voting. In CVM, point estimates of individuals’ WTP can be
obtained either simply by averaging over responses to “open-ended” questions or through
statistical analysis of response distributions in the case of “referendum format” surveys,
where payments vary randomly across respondents (Hanemann 1984). In actual referenda,
however, the payment instrument is often a tax on income. Payments within a given
jurisdiction are thus strictly related to income through the income tax schedule and do not
otherwise vary substantially among individuals. The effect of the payment level on the
probability of approval, which is the basis for calculating the distribution of actual WTP in
dichotomous choice CVM data, cannot be isolated. However, unlike valuation, validation and
calibration of hypothetical values can proceed without measuring the whole distribution of
actual WTP. Even a single point estimate of actual WTP that corresponds with a known
hypothetical WTP would provide an important benchmark calibration factor. Towards this
more modest end, assumptions similar to those underlying the median voter theorem
4 can be
used to derive estimates of actual WTP from aggregate majority voting outcomes.
                                               
4 The median voter theorem, one of the important early theorems of public choice theory and originally due to
Hotelling (1929), is presented in more detail e.g. in Mueller (1989). Application of the model to referendum
democracies is discussed in Pommerehne (1987).6
A. The median voter assumptions
The two key assumptions for the median voter theorem are that issues are defined along a
single dimension and that each voter’s preferences are single peaked in that one dimension, as
may for example be the case in expenditure issues.
5 Black (1948) proved that when these
conditions are met majority rule produces a defined equilibrium voting outcome. This
equilibrium lies at the peak-preference point of the median voter (see e.g. Mueller 1989). A
detailed list of the conditions of a “median voter equilibrium” in the institutional context of a
voter assembly or town-meeting decision process is as follows (Buchanan 1968, Blankart
1998):
I. There is institutional congruence, i.e., the voters are also consumers of the public
goods as well as being taxpayers. All potential voters participate in the vote.
II. The sharing of costs for financing the public good is determined independently of
the specific project at hand.
III. The budget is balanced (equal income and expenditures).
IV. Each issue is voted on separately. There is no tie with other projects.
V. Preference orderings are single-peaked.
VI. A project is considered accepted if it is approved of by at least a simple majority,
that is, by 0.5 n + 1 of the n voters.
                                               
5 Regarding the application of these assumptions to expenditure issues we cite Bowen (1943): “In discussing
preferred outputs of public goods it is necessary to define the units in which quantities of the public good are
measured. Due to the complexity of most public goods quantity changes may relate to both relative priorities of
various components of the good and the overall amounts of the increase or decrease. When the priorities in
providing particular components of public goods are established, the quantity of public goods can be usefully
measured in terms of money costs. This is often the case when experts or representatives determine these
priorities. The public decision about the quantity of a public good provided can then be conceived as a one-
dimensiona decision about the appropriate level of budget expenditures.”7
VII. Coalitions among voters are considered impossible due to high costs of
bargaining.
VIII. Propositions (proposed public good levels) can be adjusted in the voting process.
An illustration of the median voter equilibrium expenditure is provided in figure 1.
The median voter’s preferred expenditure given a specified tax system, corresponding with a
total public expenditure level Gm, is given by the rectangular area defined by the two
provision levels G0 and Gm and the point P in which the median voter’s demand curve
intersects with his or her marginal cost of providing the good, tm.
Turning to voting on an increase to an existing public good supply G0 the area DTm
defined by G0 , Gm and P can be interpreted as the median voter’s preferred tax increase
(given the pre-specified tax structure) for the proposed discrete change in the public good
supply. Using the assumption that the median voter is identical to the individual with median
income this tax payment can be estimated empirically (Borcherding and Deacon 1972).
However, the median voter’s WTP for the change in the public good, which is of interest in
the context of CVM calibration, is given by the entire area under the demand curve between
the two public good provision points G0 and Gm. The tax payment DTm thus seriously
underestimates the median voter’s WTP, which itself cannot be empirically estimated without
prior knowledge of the demand function.
B. Inferring maximal WTP
Contrasting to the idealized decision environment described above, assumption VIII
will in general not apply in the situation of real-world referenda on public good increases. A
median voter equilibrium proposition is unlikely due to failure of the political process before
the vote to precisely adjust expenditure to median voter preferences. However, as it turns out,8
in such real-world referendum propositions on a fixed public good increase there is an
identifiable individual whose tax payment yields information about his or her maximal WTP
for the public good. To illustrate this, consider the case of a proposition to increase the
provision of a public good from G0 to G1. Under fairly plausible conditions on WTP and tax
prices, the (unobserved) individual probability of approving the proposition, call it y*i, will be
monotone increasing in income.
6 The conditions for this to be true are examined in Schläpfer
and Hanley (2002). These conditions are closely analogous to those derived and used by
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) in equating the median of public good quantities demanded
with the quantity demanded by the citizen with median income.
7
The relationships between income, WTP, and additional tax payments underlying the
required distribution of individual approval probabilities are illustrated in figure 2. Apart from
the special case where all individuals agree with or reject the proposition (and thus no one’s
WTP can be estimated) WTP will exceed DT above some income level Ip. This is the income
of the voter, who is indifferent regarding approval or rejection of the proposition or, in other
words, whose approval probability y* equals 0.5. Thus, in contrast to the median voter case,
where the individual with median demand can be identified on the income distribution, the
identifiable individual is here the citizen with an approval probability of 0.5.
Suppose now that p percent of the individuals in the jurisdiction vote against the
proposal. From the assumption on monotonicity, identify the pth individual in the distribution
of individual approval probabilities as the pth person in the income distribution. This person
is roughly indifferent between voting in favor and voting against the proposition or, in other
                                               
6 It is perhaps useful to think of y* as of a “latent variable” underlying observed binary choices, as in statistical
models of discrete choices.
7 Bergstrom and Goodman show that, if for all incomes, e+dx > 0 (where e is the income elasticity of demand,
d￿ the ￿price elasticity of demand and  x the elasticity of the tax share with respect to income), then the higher a
citizen’s income, the more he will demand (p. 285).9
words, this person’s additional tax liability DTp  is equal to his or her maximal WTP. The
indifferent voter’s WTP for the public good change can be illustrated in a graph similar to that
above showing the median voter’s preferred public good change (figure 3). Graphically, the
area under the demand curve of the indifferent voter between the two provision levels G0 and
G1 (the indifferent voter’s WTP) is equal to the area below the indifferent voter’s tax price tp
between the two provision levels G0 and G1 (the indifferent voters tax increase DTp). (The
indifferent voter’s preferred expenditure level would be located between G0 and G1.).
Analogous to the median voter case the pth percentile voter’s additional tax liability,
DTp, may be estimated from this individual’s tax price and the magnitude of the proposed
public expenditure increase, DG. Assuming that the tax is raised on income, the indifferent
(pth) voter’s total annual tax burden Tp has the general form Tp=f(Ip)r, where f(·) is a fixed
income tax function, Ip is the pth individual’s taxable income and r is a variable tax rate which
is set annually in accordance with the total public budget (B). The indifferent voter’s tax price
is then given by tp=Tp/B. The indifferent voter’s additional tax burden DTp , or his actual WTP
for the proposed public good is thus given by DTp=tp DG, where DG is the proposed increase
of the public expenditure due to the referendum. Assuming that hypothetical WTP too is
monotone increasing in income, the indifferent voter’s WTP amount can be compared with
the pth percentile on the hypothetical WTP distribution. The ratio between the indifferent
voter’s actual WTP and the hypothetical WTP in the survey WTPHp, which would be the
appropriate “calibration factor” for hypothetical WTP Cp is given by Cp= DTp/WTPHp, where
WTPHp is the pth percentile on the WTP distribution in the CVM survey. Summarizing yields









Referenda on the provision of regional or national public goods are often held at levels
of government encompassing several or many voting districts. If sufficiently large samples of
CVM responses are available for each of several voting districts the comparison of
hypothetical and actual WTP can be made for each individual district. In the following we
apply the above approach to voting and tax liability data and CVM responses on similar,
although not identical, propositions for regional landscape protection from a group of
municipalities in the canton of Zurich, Switzerland.
III. APPLICATION TO EMPIRICAL DATA
A. The actual referendum proposition
The proposition to increase the annual budget for nature and heritage protection (NHP) in the
canton of Zurich was submitted to the voters in 1996. The proposition originated from the
initiative of a private individual who proposed specific changes to a law
8 to effect an increase
of annual NHP fund instalments from a then-current level of 10 million to 30-50 million
Swiss Francs (SFR). The initiative won preliminary support in the cantonal parliament in
1994 and was thus delegated to the cantonal executive for review. The executive rejected the
initiative, favoring instead its own formulation of a 20 million annual fund instalment and the
empowerment of the parliament to allow up to 10 additional million annually to pay off debts
of the fund. The cantonal parliament approved this revised proposal. The resultant referendum
on a 10 to 20 million increase of expenditures was accepted by 57 percent of the active voter
                                               
8 The “Law on financing of measures for nature and heritage protection and for recreation areas” of 1974.11
population. Voter turnout was 29 percent. (Office of the Parliament 1996). Use of the NHP
budget was described in the voter information journal summary as:
From the fund for nature and heritage protection the canton finances measures for
creating, maintaining, enabling access to, improving or managing landscapes,
townscapes, natural and cultural objects, and recreation areas worth of protection.
The summary ended with the words:
Only [with this increase] can the canton in the interest of the public adequately
meet its nature and heritage protection assignments in the future.
The full text expanded on more detailed expenses such as cost-sharing payments for land use
agreements with farmers (Executive Council 1996).
B. The contingent valuation survey
In the northernmost region of the canton of Zurich, comprising 26 municipalities, a CVM
survey on a comparable expansion of landscape protection expenditures was conducted three
months prior to the actual referendum. Only a short description is provided here (see
Roschewitz 1999; Schläpfer, Roschewitz, and Hanley 2002). The CVM survey proposed a
regional landscape protection programme, financed by the municipalities of the region, to
preserve the landscape of this region “in its current state”. The valuation question was posed
as:
Imagine that on the next weekend there was a vote on this programme to protect
the landscape of the Zurich Weinland. If the proposition were accepted, you12
would have to expect a maximal tax increase of SFR [X] per month. How would
you vote?
Options for answering were “yes” and “no”, and “don’t know”. Following a triple bounded
referendum procedure the question was repeated inserting adjusted tax payments taken from
one of four search trees (“And how would you vote if you would have to pay…Francs per
month?”). Finally, the interviewer added a follow-up question:
In other words, you agree to pay up to about SFR [12... · ] annually in additional
taxes for the protection of the Zurich Weinland. If this sum now appears too high
or too low, would you like to correct it?
If the answer was “yes” the respondent could then adjust the figure. These final figures of the
triple-bounded referendum with follow-up were taken as the individual’s WTP. Participation
among the 1074 selected target persons was 76 percent, yielding a total of 816 respondents. A
total of 688 valid WTP bids were obtained, yielding an effective response rate of 64 percent.
Important characteristics of the actual and the hypothetical voting propositions are
summarized in table 1
9. Both propositions basically suggested a tax increase to cover public
expenses for maintaining landscape amenities somehow threatened by development or
conversion to other uses. Although there is some difference in both the precise formulation
and the amount of detail provided – a 1500 word illustrated description in the voter journal
plus media coverage vs. a telephone interview – this difference is partly inherent to typical (as
opposed to idealized) CVM and real-world voting contexts. We argue that the correspondence
                                               
9 Some issues involved in setting up comparable CVM/referendum pairs and the degree of
correspondence between the CVM survey and the real referendum proposition in the present case are
discussed in Schläpfer, Roschewitz, and Hanley (2002).13
is sufficient to warrant proceeding with the comparison of actual and hypothetical preference
revelation.
C. Measurement of variables
The following empirical data were used for calculation. Aggregated (municipality-level)
voting outcomes are the percentages of approving votes among all valid votes. CVM
respondents could be unambiguously allocated to the individual voting districts
(municipalities) based on mail codes. Percentiles of the stated WTP distribution were
calculated from the sample of valid CVM survey responses. Income data (mean and standard
deviation of log-transformed 1996 net incomes) for each voting district were obtained from
the Cantonal Office of Statistics. For each municipality the required percentile of the income
distribution was computed from these data assuming normally distributed log-transformed
incomes. Most of the cantonal revenue comes from the income tax. It is assumed that tax
prices can be computed from income figures alone, implying that the individual with pth
income pays the same share of the municipal revenue as he or she does of the income tax.
This is an assumption of convenience, which should be modified whenever better information
is available. The applicable income tax function f(I) is composed of the fixed income tax
schedule of the cantonal tax law (Canton of Zurich 1997) and a variable tax factor r for the
year 1996 (period 1994 through 1996) of 1.08 (Office of the Parliament 1993). For the
proposed expenditure increase DG we used a figure of 15 million SFR, thus including half of
the 10 millions that may or may not be allowed by the cantonal parliament in a given year
(see description of proposition above).14
D. Legitimacy of the monotonicity assumption
Corresponding to the situation described in fn. 5 there was little debate about how
expenditures should be best allocated, indicating that the expenditure issue can be considered
as one-dimensional. Regarding violations of the condition on voter turnout, empirical
evidence indicates that (Swiss) abstainers are mostly indifferent or uninterested rather than
“frustrated” (Bühlmann et al. 2001). According to this evidence active voters should not
represent a strongly biased sample with respect to their WTP for public goods. We tested the
monotonicity assumption, which is required for identifying the pth individual on the
distribution of approval probability with the pth individual on the income distribution, using
aggregate voting and income data. The following evidence for a reasonable agreement with
monotonicity assumptions can be offered. OLS regression of the logit transformed approval
rates (aggregated voting data) in the municipalities of the canton of Zurich on mean municipal
log-transformed net income (among other variables) yielded a highly significant positive
income effect in spite of the progressive income taxation (n=171; p < 0.001; partial R
2 of
income: 0.18). At the mean income level a 10% increase in income yielded an absolute
increase in approval rate of the referendum of 2.2% (Schläpfer and Hanley, 2001. WTP
distributions obtained in the CVM survey showed the expected positive income effect. For the
municipality with the largest number of survey respondents, income was significant in simple
regression models of individual WTP (n=348; p < 0.001; partial R
2 of income: 0.04). ). The
condition that individual WTP and approval probability to the referendum, apart from a
random effect of taste, are monotone increasing in income thus appears to be fairly well
realized in the present voting decision.15
E. Results
At the level of the entire Canton of Zurich, at which the referendum was held and accepted by
57 percent and rejected by 43 percent of active voters, the monotonicity assumption yielded a
1996 income of the indifferent (43rd percentile) voter of SFR 35,480. This income level
corresponded to a cantonal income tax liability of SFR 1400 and to an expected increase in
tax liability due to the referendum of SFR 6.25. This figure thus represents a rough estimate
of the indifferent voter’s actual WTP for the proposed increase of the public good. For
comparison, the 43rd percentile of stated WTP across all individuals of the CVM survey area
(in which the above proposition was approved with 55 percent of the votes) amounted to SFR
240. The comparison suggests that survey responses obtained from individuals with median
WTP for increased landscape protection overestimated these individual’s actual WTP as
taxpayers by a factor of about 38. Stated WTP in this case would require multiplication by a
calibration factor of 0.026 to yield actual WTP.
Variables involved in the calculation and calibration factors obtained for the pth
percentile voters and CVM respondents (where p is the percentage of disapproving voters), in
each of the individual municipalities for which voting and tax liability data as well as CVM
responses were available, are shown in table 2. The ratio of stated and implied actual WTP
ranged from 19.8 to 49.1 (table 2, second to last row), with a mean value of 34.3. The
variation in this ratio was largely due to a high variation in stated WTP distributions, which in
turn is due to relatively small sample sizes for stated WTP for the individual municipalities.
Appropriate calibration factors for stated WTP accordingly ranged from about 0.02 to 0.05
(table 2, last row). It is important to note in the context of these results, however, that the
present CVM had not overcome all potential pitfalls of the contingent valuation method, and
calibration factors may be very different in other CVM survey contexts.16
IV. DISCUSSION
The use of voting data for validation and calibration of stated values of public goods is
attractive because it allows the study of true public good choices in a context with real
consequences to the individual taxpayer. Observed individual voting behavior in a public
budget decision provides only an upper or lower bound estimate on individuals’ actual WTP
for the proposed public good, corresponding with their expected tax payment. The purpose of
this study was to describe and apply an approach, which enables one to compare point
estimates of hypothetical WTP with actual WTP inferred from incentive compatible voting
choices. We showed that, given hypothetical and actual referendum choices on identical and
one-dimensional public good expenditure issues, an “indifferent voter” approach to
calibrating hypothetical WTP is feasible. In contrast to previously used calibration methods,
the present approach allowed us to compare actual and hypothetical choices about a public
good with significant passive-use value, as public decision-makers typically face them. The
empirical application, although subject to several limitations, suggests a strong upward bias of
hypothetical values for the present public good issue and CVM study. The calibration factors
of around 1/35 are smaller than in most previous calibration studies using private goods or
donations contexts which have reported calibration factors in the range of about 1/0.8 to 1/40
(see e.g., Foster, Bateman, and Harley 1997). Circumstances which may have contributed to
the large bias in the present CVM survey include a high “social desirability” of the valuation
object and a rather vague formulation of the hypothetical voting proposal compared to the
actual referendum proposal (Schläpfer, Roschewitz, and Hanley 2002).
The accuracy of obtained calibration factors depends crucially on the extent to which
the underlying assumptions can be matched in specific actual CVM and voting comparisons.
Assumptions underlying the application of the method include (1) the median voter model
assumptions outlined in section II, (2) reasonably accurate identification of “pth percentile”17
voters, taxpayers and CVM bidders, which may depend on voter turnout, income elasticity of
approval probability, and CVM response rate, (3) individuals’ realistic perception of their
expected tax liability, (4) comparability of the CVM and voting propositions and (5) a best
practice CVM survey process that remains unaffected by the actual referendum. Some of
these assumptions used in computing estimates are admittedly strong. Great care should thus
be exercised in interpreting the calibration factors we found. While this study sets out a basic
approach to calibrating contingent values for public goods, the empirical estimates can by no
means be regarded as representative of CVM surveys more generally.
Carefully designed further applications are necessary to obtain more reliable results
and to investigate differences in calibration factors across different goods and across different
CVM survey designs and qualities. A sufficient record of such studies for would have obvious
benefits for further improvements of CVM methodology. They should provide a fairly robust
means to evaluate alternative designs and develop empirically based rules for CVM
applications to public goods with passive-use value. Moreover, they should allow inferences
to be drawn regarding the potential for calibrating responses in situations where no
opportunity for external validation is available.18
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Table 1. Characteristics of the compared hypothetical and actual voting decisions
Contingent valuation survey Actual referendum
Proposition new regional landscape
conservation program
increase of cantonal fund for
nature and heritage protection
Government level
a municipalities of Weinland canton of Zurich
Question format triple-bounded referendum with
follow-up
simple referendum
Decision rule simple majority rule simple majority rule
Payment instrument municipal tax cantonal tax
Relevant population citizens with right to vote citizens with right to vote
Date 20 June to 20 July, 1996 22 September, 1996
a Government in Switzerland knows three subsidiary levels, municipal, cantonal, and federal.
Referenda are held and taxes are raised at each of these. The canton of Zurich encompasses 171
municipalities.24
Table 2. Comparison of the indifferent (pth percentile) voter’s WTP estimated from (a) voting
and tax liability data and (b) survey responses for 16 municipalities
a






































Andelfingen 55 52,717 12.12 31 240 19.8 0.051
Benken 70 70,924 19.49 13 720 37.0 0.027
Buch a.I. 65 65,474 17.12 12 381 22.3 0.045
Dachsen 57 51,230 11.55 13 240 20.8 0.048
Feuerthalen 41 32,703   5.45 29 240 44.1 0.023
Flaach 68 66,947 17.76 14 436 24.5 0.041
Flurlingen 52 48,839 10.63 17 360 33.9 0.030
Henggart 58 54,832 12.94 25 478 36.9 0.027
Kleinandelfingen 60 53,532 12.44 33 484 38.9 0.026
Marthalen 59 52,964 12.22 25 600 49.1 0.020
Oberstammheim 72 66,499 17.56 14 600 34.2 0.029
Ossingen 57 48,586 10.55 19 256 24.2 0.041
Rheinau 56 50,355 11.21 24 240 21.4 0.047
Trullikon 67 59,977 14.92 15 731 49.0 0.020
Unterstammheim 59 49,859 11.02 15 542 49.2 0.020
Winterthur 40 32,623   5.42 340 240 44.3 0.023
a Ten small municipalities of the survey region with less than ten respondents in the
CVM survey sample are not included in this table.
b See Schläpfer, Roschewitz, and Hanley (2002) for a detailed description of the CVM
survey procedures.
c The recurring value of 240 is due the fact that many respondents chose a round monthly
WTP of SFR 20 in the valuation question.25
Figure 1. Median voter equilibrium level of public expenditure (Gm) resulting from an
(idealized) democratic budget process
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Figure 2 Identification of the indifferent “pth percentile” voter with the pth percentile
individual on the income distribution: illustration of the conditions on individual
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A.p. of p percent
of the voters27
Figure 3. The indifferent (pth percentile) voter’s WTP for an increase of a public good from
provision level G0 to G1.
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